Louisiana Law Review
Volume 78
Number 4 Spring 2018

Article 16

5-1-2018

Policing Hate: The Problematic Expansion of Louisiana’s Hate
Crime Statute to Include Police Officers
Savannah Walker

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Savannah Walker, Policing Hate: The Problematic Expansion of Louisiana’s Hate Crime Statute to Include
Police Officers, 78 La. L. Rev. (2018)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol78/iss4/16

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Policing Hate: The Problematic Expansion of
Louisiana’s Hate Crime Statute to Include Police
Officers
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ................................................................................ 1413
I.

Hate Crime Laws: A Broad Overview ....................................... 1417
A. Defining “Hate Crime” ........................................................ 1417
B. Why We Legislate Hate ....................................................... 1418
C. Structure of State Hate Crime Statutes ................................ 1419

II.

Dissecting the Flaws of the Blue Lives Matter Law .................. 1421
A. The Unnecessary Expressive Purpose ................................. 1422
B. The Practical Shortcomings ................................................. 1424
1. Police Officer Status Does Not Fit into a
Hate Crime Statute ........................................................ 1425
2. The Blue Lives Matter Law Will Not Be
Used Effectively ............................................................ 1428
a. Potential Underuse .................................................. 1428
b. Potential Misuse ..................................................... 1432

III. Recommended Solutions ............................................................ 1435
A. Revising the Law: An Imperfect Solution ........................... 1435
B. Repealing the Law: Nothing Lost, Plenty Gained ............... 1442
Conclusion.................................................................................. 1444
INTRODUCTION
On December 20, 2014, Officers Rafael Ramos and Wenjian Liu of
the New York City Police Department were sitting in a parked patrol car
in Brooklyn, New York when a man armed with a handgun approached
from the passenger side and fired multiple rounds into the vehicle,
instantly killing both officers.1 At a press conference that evening, the New
Copyright 2018, by SAVANNAH WALKER.
1. Melanie Eversley, Katharine Lackey & Trevor Hughes, Two NYPD
Officers Killed in Ambush Style Shooting, USA TODAY (Dec. 21, 2014, 9:21 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/20/new-york-city-policeofficers-shot/20698679/ [https://perma.cc/NN3C-QGF7].
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York City Police Commissioner announced that the shooter deliberately
targeted the police officers “for their uniform and the responsibility they
embraced.”2 The Commissioner pointed to posts on the shooter’s social
media accounts foreshadowing a plan to “put wings on pigs” in retaliation
for the highly protested police killings of Eric Garner and Michael Brown3
as evidence of the killer’s bias against police officers.4
The outrage surrounding the assassination of Officers Ramos and Liu
was widespread.5 Politicians and protesters alike condemned the
violence.6 Many people, however, believed the shooting was not a
senseless, isolated act but evidence of something bigger: law enforcement
was under systematic attack, a phenomenon politicians hastily dubbed a
“war on cops.”7
In the spring of 2016, Louisiana State Representative Lance Harris
drafted House Bill 953,8 a solution to what he perceived as an intentional
crusade to terrorize police officers evidenced by the murders of Ramos

2. Id.
3. Ismaiiyl Brinsley (@dontrunup), INSTAGRAM (Dec. 20, 2014), archived at
http://gawker.com/cop-killers-instagram-im-putting-wings-on-pigs-today-1673793
374 (last visited Sept. 6, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ZP2C-M8HE]; Ferguson Unrest:
from Shooting to Nationwide Protests, BBC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc
.com/news/world-us-canada-30193354 [https://perma.cc/4FE5-YA3G]; Al Baker,
Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-statenisland.html [https://perma.cc/2DXZ-9YR8].
4. Eversley et al., supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Steve Benen, Ted Cruz Shows How Not to Respond to Police
Killings, MSNBC (Sept. 2, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/rachelmaddow-show/ted-cruz-shows-how-not-respond-police-killings (quoting Senator
Ted Cruz, who remarked that cops are “feeling the assault” nationwide)
[https://perma.cc/PW2T-JKW7]; Radley Balko, Scott Walker Couldn’t Be More
Wrong About the Threat to Police Officers, W ASH. P OST (Sept. 3, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/09/03/scott-walkercouldnt-be-more-wrong-about-the-threat-to-police-officers/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.5
84f49b74c56 (criticizing Wisconsin governor Scott Walker’s comments on what he
perceives as “a disturbing trend of police officers being murdered on the job”)
[https://perma.cc/77HD-YFQN].
8. H.B. 953, Reg. Sess. (La. 2016).
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and Liu9 and a similar murder of a deputy in Cypress, Texas.10 The bill was
termed the “Blue Lives Matter” bill, its name being a response to Black
Lives Matter, a civil rights group11 that has been accused of inciting antipolice violence through its protests of police activity.12 The bill sought to
modify Louisiana’s hate crime statute, which provides increased penalties
for offenders who select their victims based on the individual victim’s race,
age, gender, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national
origin, ancestry, or organizational affiliation.13 The modification added
“actual or perceived employment as a law enforcement officer, firefighter,
or emergency medical services personnel” to the list of protected
characteristics.14
The bill passed the House unanimously and passed the Senate by a
margin of 33-3.15 Governor John Bel Edwards signed it into law on May
26, 2016, officially making Louisiana the first state to offer additional
protection to law enforcement officers through hate crime legislation.16

9. Elizabeth Crisp, ‘Blue Lives Matter’: Louisiana Legislature Considers
Hate Crime Protections for Police, Firefighters, ADVOCATE (Apr. 26, 2016, 3:26
PM), http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/Legislature/article
_f82c5a03-f31a-5574-bc5b-f1311aa1348f.html (explaining that Representative
Harris cited the murders of Ramos and Liu in his proposal) [https://perma.cc
/MK86-DPLR].
10. See Elizabeth Chuck & James Novogrod, Texas Deputy Darren Goforth,
Slain at Cypress Gas Station, Remembered at Funeral, NBC NEWS (Sept. 4, 2015,
3:19 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/crime-courts/thousands-attend-funeraltexas-deputy-darren-goforth-n421831 [https://perma.cc/4JKG-TC9B].
11. “Black Lives Matter” began as a protest cry after the 2012 fatal shooting
of unarmed African-American teenager Trayvon Martin but now refers to a
national political group that includes 30 official chapters. See Alex Altman,
Person of the Year, the Short List: No. 4, Black Lives Matter, TIME (Dec. 2015),
http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2015-runner-up-black-lives-matter/
[https://perma.cc/WBX9-USV6]. The group protests various forms of perceived
racial oppression and injustice, but its largest and most visible protests have been
those aimed at police brutality following the high-profile deaths of several
African-American men at the hands of law enforcement. See id.
12. Richard Perez-Pena, Louisiana Enacts Hate Crime Laws to Protect a New
Group: Police, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27
/us/louisiana-enacts-hate-crimes-law-to-protect-a-new-group-police.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/3T44-MYL6].
13. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:107.2 (2018).
14. Act No. 953, 2016 La. Acts 2038.
15. Perez-Pena, supra note 12.
16. Id.
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Legislators across the country subsequently have proposed similar bills at
both state17 and federal18 levels.
Upon signing the bill, Governor Edwards declared that law
enforcement officers deserve every available protection,19 but he chose the
wrong avenue for effectuating this protection. The hate crime statute is an
improper safeguard against anti-police crimes for two main reasons. First,
status as a police officer is not the kind of identity characteristic that
belongs in a hate crime statute.20 Second, the Blue Lives Matter
amendment will not effectively protect police officers from the kinds of
violent attacks that inspired its existence because the law’s structure makes
it an impractical tool to prosecute such offenses.21 Instead, the
modification will weaken Louisiana’s hate crime statute by opening it up
to massive over-expansion and may ultimately exacerbate the ongoing
social conflict between citizens and police officers.22 To avoid these
consequences and serve the legitimate purpose of police protection, the
Blue Lives Matter law should be repealed or, at the very least, rewritten.
Part I of this Comment discusses the purpose of hate crime laws
through historical context, explaining the various forms the laws take at
the state level. Part II introduces Louisiana’s hate crime statute, analyzes
the inconsistencies in the Blue Lives Matter amendment, and predicts the
consequences the amendment will have on hate crime law, citizens, and
social unity. Part III proposes the repeal of the amendment and considers
heavy modification of the statute as an alternative solution. Finally, this
Comment implores the Louisiana Legislature (“Legislature”) to use either
of these solutions, both of which will protect police officers while avoiding
the array of problems created by the Blue Lives Matter amendment.

17. See, e.g., Jonathan Silver, Abbott: Targeted Killing of Police Should Be a
Hate Crime, TEX. TRIBUNE (July 18, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016
/07/18/abbott-wants-killing-police-officer-become-hate-cr/ (explaining Texas’s
Police Protection Act, which would extend hate crime protections to law
enforcement officers) [https://perma.cc/DL9H-LRVZ].
18. Attacks on Police Are Hateful, but Are They Hate Crimes?, L.A. TIMES
(Aug. 16, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-edpolice-hate-20160816-snap-story.html (explaining Representative Ken Buck’s
“Blue Lives Matter Act,” a bill similar to Louisiana’s that expands the federal hate
crime statute to cover police officers) [https://perma.cc/9QXY-27NV].
19. Gov. Edwards Signs HB 953, Five Veterans’ Bills, OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNOR (May 26, 2016), http://gov.louisiana.gov/news/gov-edwards-signshb-953-five-veterans-bills [https://perma.cc/JXP4-FN5B].
20. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
21. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
22. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
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I. HATE CRIME LAWS: A BROAD OVERVIEW
Criminal acts inspired by prejudice are harmful to a multiethnic,
multiracial, and multireligious society.23 Since the late 1960s,24 legislators
have addressed this narrow class of offenses through hate crime laws,
which serve a unique and crucial purpose in the legal system.25 By
specifically targeting bias-inspired offenses, the laws seek to condemn
prejudice and protect citizens from the crimes that violate the principles of
equality and anti-discrimination that are central to American culture.26
A. Defining “Hate Crime”
The term “hate crime” became a topic of national conversation in the
1980s following the introduction of the Hate Crime Statistics Act
(“HCSA”),27 which required the Department of Justice to collect and
publish statistics on crimes motivated by racial, religious, or ethnic
prejudice.28 Since that time, the federal government and 48 states have
adopted different variations of hate crime statutes.29 The Federal Bureau
of Investigation (“FBI”) defines hate crimes as “traditional offense[s], like
murder, arson, or vandalism with an added element of bias.”30 A hate
crime has two components: (1) the offender must commit a crime; and (2)
the offender must be motivated to commit the crime because of his hatred
23. See discussion infra Part I.B.
24. The most direct precursor to modern hate crime statutes is United States
Code § 245, enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Avlana Eisenberg,
Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 865 (2014). The law allows federal
prosecution of anyone who interferes with victims’ participation in certain federally
protected activities—such as attending school and voting—because of the victim’s
race, color, religion, or national origin. See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (2018).
25. FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER
AMERICAN LAW 1 (2002).
26. Id. at 42.
27. JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND
IDENTITY POLITICS 4 (2000). The HCSA became law in 1990. See 28 U.S.C. § 534.
28. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 4.
29. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 867.
30. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WHAT WE INVESTIGATE: CIVIL
RIGHTS, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/civil-rights/hate-crimes (last visited
Apr. 5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/F98Z-2HY2]. Because of the bias requirement,
hate crimes are commonly called “bias crimes.” See, e.g., LAWRENCE, supra note
25, at 9 (explaining that he uses the term “bias crime” rather than “hate crime” to
emphasize that the key factor in a bias crime is not the perpetrator’s hatred of the
victim but his prejudice or bias toward that victim).
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of the victim.31 To meet the second requirement, the hatred motivating the
offender must be connected to the offender’s general antipathy for a
protected group or for the victim specifically because of membership in
that group.32 In short, the perpetrator must commit the crime not because
of who the victim is as an individual but because the victim represents the
group that the perpetrator hates.33
B. Why We Legislate Hate
Although hate crime laws vary in the characteristics they protect and
the penalties they impose, the core practical purpose of hate crime
legislation is to combat and condemn violence against people based on
fundamental features of their identity.34 The deterrence efficacy of the
laws is unclear.35 There is little evidence to prove definitively that enacting
hate crime statutes reduces the occurrence of hate crimes.36 The laws’
debatable deterrent effects, however, do not detract from their expressive
value.37 Hate crime laws send messages.38 To victims, the laws convey
messages of support and solidarity,39 and to society, they serve as an
official condemnation of bigotry.40 The laws are symbolic political acts
that evoke strong emotions in the public and shape their expectations by

31. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 9.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 867 (quoting then-President Obama’s
description of a federal hate crime law as an important step that would “help
protect our citizens from violence based on what they look like, who they love,
[or] how they pray”).
35. Susan B. Gellman & Frederick M. Lawrence, Agreeing to Agree: A
Proponent and Opponent of Hate Crime Laws Reach For Common Ground, 41
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 421, 428 (2004); see also Alex Ginsburg, Hate is Enough:
How New York’s Bias Crimes Statute Has Exceeded Its Intended Scope, 76
BROOK. L. REV. 1599, 1607 (2011) (explaining that detractors argue that hate
crime statutes do nothing to actually deter hate crimes).
36. Gellman & Lawrence, supra note 35, at 429 (describing studies that failed
to find that enacting hate crime statutes had any effect on hate crime rates).
37. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 858.
38. Laura Meli, Hate Crime and Punishment: Why Typical Punishment Does
Not Fit The Crime, U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 921, 948 (2014).
39. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 67.
40. Id. at 68.
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establishing a societal norm against crimes rooted in identity-based
prejudice.41
Generally, state legislatures seek to accomplish the practical and
expressive purposes of hate crime laws by punishing more severely those
offenders motivated by prejudice.42 Hate crimes are especially detrimental
to victims because they often cause greater physical43 and psychological44
harm than parallel crimes with motives other than bias.45 Hate crimes also
damage society because they are likely to provoke retaliatory crimes and
create turmoil in the community.46 By imposing harsher penalties on those
persons who commit hate crimes, legislators acknowledge the unique
harms that the crimes cause and reaffirm the seriousness of the offenses.47
C. Structure of State Hate Crime Statutes
State hate crime statutes can be divided into two separate but
overlapping analytical models: the discriminatory selection model48 and
the animus model.49 Under a discriminatory selection statute, any offense
in which the offender chooses the victim for a discriminatory reason

41. Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive
Law, or Tool for Criminal Enforcement, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1259 (2000).
42. Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1608 (explaining that the majority of state
hate crime statutes are sentence enhancement statutes that increase the penalty for
certain crimes when the offender’s motive involves a certain prejudice); see also
JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 29.
43. Meli, supra note 38, at 951 (explaining that in comparison to assault with
other motives, hate crime assaults are twice as likely to cause serious injury to the
victim and four times as likely to necessitate hospitalization).
44. Id.; see also LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 40 (explaining that hate crime
victims often feel helpless because they cannot reasonably minimize the risk of future
attacks without changing the central identity characteristic that made them victims).
45. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 4142.
46. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488 (1993).
47. Meli, supra note 38, at 948.
48. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 30.
49. Lawrence refers specifically to “racial” animus and “racial or ethnic
group” of the victim, but the classification of “racial animus” statutes is
understood by some scholars to refer to animus on the basis of any characteristic
covered by a hate crime statute, not only race. For that purpose, it sometimes is
referred to as the “animus” model. See, e.g., Raegan Jorn, Mean Streets: Violence
Against the Homeless and the Makings of a Hate Crime, 6 HASTINGS RACE &
POVERTY L.J. 305, 314 (2009); see also Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1608
(referring to Lawrence’s racial animus model as the “group animus” model).
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constitutes a hate crime.50 Animus statutes have a motive component,
requiring that the offender be motivated by animus toward the victim’s
identity group.51 The distinction is best illustrated through an example.
Offender A exclusively robs Asian people because he believes that they
generally carry more valuables than people of other ethnicities.52 Offender
B exclusively robs Asian people because he dislikes them as a group and
hopes to intimidate them into leaving his neighborhood.53 Offender A has
committed a hate crime under a discriminatory selection statute because
he selected the victim on the basis of race—but not under a racial animus
statute because he lacks bias motivation.54 Offender B meets the specific
subset of bias crimes covered by animus statutes.55 Discriminatory
selection statutes are broad enough to cover opportunistic crimes with bias
elements while animus statutes focus on crimes of pure hate.56
Legislative history suggests that regardless of the statutory model
chosen, legislators enact hate crime laws to combat attacks motivated by
prejudice.57 Animus statutes, which explicitly require proof of such
motives, more precisely target the crimes the statutes seek to address.58
Still, the majority of states, including Louisiana,59 continue to use the

50. Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1608. Under a typical discriminatory selection
statute, an offender commits a hate crime if he or she “intentionally selects the person
against whom [the crime] is committed because of his race, religious conviction, color
or national origin.” See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (2018).
51. Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1608. A typical animus statute requires proof
of “prejudice,” “bigotry and bias,” or “hostility” based on the victim’s identity.
See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 870; see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (2018)
(enhancing penalties when the crime “evidences prejudice based on” designated
characteristics); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6(I)(f) (2018) (extending sentence
of an offender who “[w]as substantially motivated to commit the crime because
of hostility towards the victim’s religion, race, creed, sexual orientation”).
52. See LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 30.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1608.
57. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 870.
58. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 79 (arguing that an animus model statute
more appropriately defines a bias crime); see also JACOBS & POTTER, supra note
27, at 146 (arguing that hate crime statutes should use the narrowest possible
definition by requiring group based animus to prevent mere “fights involving
epithets” from being classified as hate crimes).
59. See LA. REV. STAT. § 14:107.2 (2018) (making it unlawful for any person
to select the victim of certain enumerated offenses “because of actual or
perceived” protected characteristics); see also LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 35–
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discriminatory selection model,60 generating concern that the broadly
applicable laws may grant prosecutors the power to punish a much wider
array of offenses than intended.61 Concerns of overreach have been
exacerbated by the trend of hate crime law expansion62 that has recently
reached Louisiana’s statute through the Blue Lives Matter amendment.
II. DISSECTING THE FLAWS OF THE BLUE LIVES MATTER LAW
Since its enactment in 1997, Louisiana’s statute has included a vast
list of protected characteristics, including “actual or perceived race, age,
gender, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national
origin, or ancestry” and “actual or perceived membership or service in, or
employment with, an organization.”63 In 2016, the Blue Lives Matter
amendment further expanded the law by adding “actual or perceived
employment as a law enforcement officer, firefighter, or emergency
medical services personnel” to the list of protected characteristics.64
Representative Harris proposed the bill as an additional means of
protecting police officers.65 Governor Edwards concurred, describing the
bill as a well-deserved protection for police officers that sent a clear
message of Louisiana’s refusal to tolerate hate crimes.66 Representative
Harris and Governor Edwards’s comments suggest that the purpose of the
law is twofold: to send a message about the seriousness of crimes against
police and provide extra legislative protection for police officers.

36 (explaining that most states use statutes with “because of” language consistent
with a discriminatory selection model).
60. Jorn, supra note 49, at 312 (explaining that many states adopted
discriminatory selection statutes modeled after Wisconsin’s statute upheld by the
Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993)).
61. Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1602.
62. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
63. § 14:107.2. When the underlying offense is a misdemeanor, the offender
may be required to pay a fine of up to $500, be imprisoned for up to six months,
or both. § 14:107.2(B). When the underlying offense is a felony, the offender may
be fined up to $5,000, be imprisoned for up to five years, or both. § 14:107.2(C).
These sentences run consecutively with the sentences for the underlying offenses.
§ 14:107.2(C).
64. H.B. 953, Reg. Sess. (La. 2016).
65. Perez-Pena, supra note 12 (quoting Representative Harris, who explained that
“[he] just wanted to give an extra level of protection to the people who protect us”).
66. See OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 19 (quoting Governor Edwards,
who stated that “[police officers] deserve every protection that we can give them”).
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Unfortunately, the law is ill-equipped to serve either purpose effectively.67
Its language makes it difficult to use as a means of protection, and the
practical enforcement of the law is likely to contradict any message that it
sends.68 Furthermore, the law could actually jeopardize the effectiveness
of the hate crime statute as a whole.69
A. The Unnecessary Expressive Purpose
Generally, hate crime laws do not fill any practical void in the criminal
law because they recriminalize already criminal behavior.70 The purpose
of the laws is instead largely expressive.71 The laws warn potential
offenders that crimes rooted in bias are particularly reprehensible and will
be punished severely.72 For traditional hate crime statutes, this message
signified a shift in policy, demonstrating the government’s commitment to
treating crimes that had long been downplayed or ignored as serious
offenses.73 In contrast, the Blue Lives Matter law sends a message about
crimes against police that is wholly unnecessary. 74
There is no evidence suggesting that crimes against police are, like
other hate crimes, underreported or insufficiently investigated.75 On the
contrary, the crimes are documented meticulously76 and prosecuted
67. See Collier Meyerson, The Case Against ‘Blue Lives Matter’ Bills, THE
NATION (May 23, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/case-blue-lives-matterbills/ (explaining the difficulty of prosecuting crimes against police under a hate
crime statute) [https://perma.cc/HG4S-VFJU].
68. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 858.
69. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
70. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 5 (arguing that hate crime statutes
did not come about because of a lacuna in criminal law; rather, crime statutes
came about because of the rising significance of identity politics).
71. Beale, supra note 41, at 1255.
72. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 68.
73. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 865 (explaining how United States
Code § 245, a precursor to modern hate crime statutes, sought to address the
racially motivated violence that state governments had largely ignored).
74. See Attacks Against Police Are Not Hate Crimes, ANTI-DEFAMATION
LEAGUE (June 7, 2016), https://www.adl.org/blog/attacks-against-police-are-nothate-crimes [https://perma.cc/U6QF-MFZM].
75. Id.
76. The Federal Bureau of Investigation specifically tracks crimes against
police and prepares an annual report on the findings. See, e.g., FBI Releases 2015
Preliminary Statistics for Law Enforcement Officers Killed in the Line of Duty,
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (May 16, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news
/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2015-preliminary-statistics-for-law-enforce
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vigorously77 through criminal statutes that carry significant penalties. For
example, an offender who commits simple battery on a civilian faces a
maximum sentence of six months,78 but an offender who commits the same
offense on a police officer will serve a minimum sentence of one year.79
Though an offender who commits aggravated assault on a civilian faces a
maximum sentence of only six months,80 the same offense committed on
a police officer carries a maximum sentence of ten years.81 Hate crime
laws use heightened penalties to demonstrate the gravity of the offense,
but Louisiana legislators sufficiently conveyed the seriousness of crimes
against police officers well before the existence of the Blue Lives Matter
law.82 The law does not send a new message but simply restates a message
that has long been apparent.83
Admittedly, however, pre-existing criminal statutes that adequately
address offenses against a particular group do not always justify
withholding hate crime coverage from that group. Before gender was
widely included as a protected characteristic in hate crime statutes,
opponents of the inclusion argued that the addition was unnecessary
because violence against women was already well covered by existing
criminal law provisions.84 Proponents argued in response that by
excluding gender, legislators were implying to victims of gender violence
that they did not deserve the same level of protection as victims of ethnic,
racial, or religious prejudice crimes.85 Essentially, the proponents
implored legislators to consider not only the communicative impact of
adding a characteristic to the statute but also the impact of its exclusion.86

ment-officers-killed-in-the-line-of-duty [https://perma.cc/EWX7-G9QP].
77. Making Attacks Against Police Hate Crimes Goes Too Far, DENV. POST
(July 20, 2016, 5:18 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/07/20/making-attacksagainst-police-hate-crimes-goes-too-far/ (noting that the justice system “comes
down extra hard” when a police officer is harmed) [https://perma.cc/K9Z4-PM3D].
78. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:35(B) (2018).
79. Id. § 14:34.2(B).
80. Id. § 14:37.
81. Id. § 14:37.2.
82. Perez-Pena, supra note 12.
83. Id.
84. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 15 (explaining the argument that the
legislature had already addressed violence against women through its laws on
domestic violence and sexual assault).
85. Id. at 17.
86. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 133 (explaining that during the
debate over adding sexual orientation to bias crime statutes, the director of the
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force argued that if sexual orientation was not
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The eventual success of those advocating expansion suggests that a
redundant law is preferable to exclusion when exclusion would devalue
victims. Excluding police officers, however, will not have a significant
negative effect.87 Louisiana legislators clearly demonstrated that police
officers are worthy of protection by imposing significantly harsher
penalties upon those who harm them.88 Further, states heavily arm police
and give them full authority to protect themselves.89 Leaving
“employment as a police officer” out of the hate crime statute does not
negate the message conveyed by existing protections, and including it does
not send any new message that would necessitate the addition.90
B. The Practical Shortcomings
Even expressive laws should do more than symbolize political
recognition of an issue to constitute a proper exercise of the legislative
function.91 Legislators should also consider the law’s practical and
measurable goals.92 If the goal of the Blue Lives Matter law is to protect
police officers from attacks, the hate crime statute is not the proper
means.93 “Employment as a police officer” is not the kind of identity trait
contemplated by hate crime legislation, and including it threatens the
legitimacy of the law by inviting constitutional challenges and
overexpansion.94 Furthermore, the statute is unlikely to be an effective

included, the law would be sending “a dangerous signal that this kind of crime is
less reprehensible”).
87. See DENV. POST, supra note 77; see also Arjun Singh Sethi, Louisiana Draws
Blue Line in Wrong Places, CNN (July 6, 2016, 5:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com
/2016/07/06/opinions/baton-rouge-blue-lives-matter-law-arjun-sethi/ [https://perma.cc
/B6CF-E2LF].
88. DENV. POST, supra note 77.
89. See Sethi, supra note 87 (arguing that unlike minority communities,
police officers have always been supported by the law, which grants them
immense power); see also Meyerson, supra note 67 (quoting civil rights attorney
Jonathan Moore’s argument that police officers already “get so much benefit of
the doubt from juries and legal immunity”).
90. See Perez-Pena, supra note 12.
91. Gellman & Lawrence, supra note 35, at 429.
92. Id.
93. See discussion infra Part III.B.
94. See generally Scott Steiner, Habitations of Cruelty: The Pitfalls of
Expanding Hate Crime Legislation to Include the Homeless, 45 No. 5 CRIM. L.
BULL. 836 (2009) (making a similar argument regarding efforts to expand state
hate crime laws to protect homeless people).
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source of protection.95 Its language creates burdens that make it an
inefficient choice for prosecuting serious crimes against police but leaves
open the possibility of use far beyond its contemplated purpose.96
1. Police Officer Status Does Not Fit into a Hate Crime Statute
Opponents of hate crime laws often criticize the laws’ perceived
unfairness.97 The laws are plagued by the notion that they favor certain
groups of people by granting them special protections.98 The idea of
special protection generally is used to oppose the existence of the laws.99
Representative Harris, however, actually relied on that idea in proposing
the Blue Lives Matter law. He explained that because Louisiana’s hate
crime statute already covered many other groups, it was appropriate to add
police and first responders.100 His words suggest that the expansion was
intended to equitably grant police officers the special protections that the
hate crime law offered to other groups.101
Representative Harris’s proposal demonstrates a fundamental
misconception about the purpose of hate crime laws. The laws do not seek
to single out certain groups of people for protection—instead they aim to
protect all people from attacks motivated by prejudice toward enumerated
characteristics.102 The laws achieve equal applicability by including only
neutral characteristics inherent in all people: for example, a hate crime law
does not explicitly provide harsher penalties for an offender who assaults
a homosexual but rather for any offender who assaults any victim on the
basis of sexual orientation.103 To say that such a law protects homosexuals
may be a description of the law’s effect, but it is not an accurate description
of how the law is written.104 Until the Blue Lives Matter law, Louisiana’s
hate crime statute did not offer greater protection to any one group.

95. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
96. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 898.
97. Steiner, supra note 94, at 836.
98. Id. at 837.
99. Id. at 829 (explaining that California’s efforts to expand its hate crime law
was met with the argument that “the legislature should not hand-pick a few victims”).
100. Greg Hilburn, ‘Blue Lives Matter’ Bill Expected to Become Law in
Louisiana, USA TODAY (May 24, 2016, 7:11 AM), http://www.usatoday.com
/story/news/nation-now/2016/05/23/blue-lives-matter-bill/84821440/ [https://per
ma.cc/48R2-2FCE].
101. Id.
102. Steiner, supra note 94, at 837.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 812.
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Police officer status, however, is not universally applicable but singles
out a specific subset of the population. By adding this trait to the hate crime
statute, legislators have elevated one specific class of victims above the
others.105 They have inadvertently validated the previously inaccurate
criticism that hate crime laws fundamentally are unfair.106
Opponents of hate crime laws often expand upon the notion of the
laws’ unfairness to question their constitutionality, alleging that the
statutes grant special legal protections to certain groups and deny them to
others in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection of the laws.107 Several state supreme courts have relied on the
neutrality of the laws to reject this argument and uphold their
constitutionality.108 For example, in State v. Ladue, the Vermont Supreme
Court dismissed the argument that Vermont’s hate crime statute favors classes
of persons based on race, sex, orientation, and other characteristics.109 The
court explained that the statute does not treat similarly situated victims
differently but protects all victims from crimes motivated by hate, “whether
this hate is directed at minority or majority members of a class.”110
Similarly, in State v. Talley, the Washington Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Washington’s hate crime statute because its facial
neutrality made it applicable to any defendant who targeted any victim on
the basis of any of the listed characteristics.111
These decisions suggest that hate crime laws draw their legitimacy
from their neutrality.112 Laws that are universally applicable avoid running
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause by providing the benefit of protection
from prejudice to all citizens rather than favoring a single class of
persons.113 By including police officer status, the Legislature has created
a law that grants special protection to one group while excluding other

105. See id. (explaining that until the proposed addition of homelessness as a
protected characteristic, not a single special group was created by hate crime laws
in the United States).
106. See id. (arguing that expansion of a hate crime law to cover homelessness
gives traction to criticism).
107. Id. at 836; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
108. See Steiner, supra note 94, at 812.
109. State v. Ladue, 631 A.2d 236 (Vt. 1993).
110. Id. at 237.
111. State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217, 22930 (Wash. 1993).
112. Steiner, supra note 94, at 820 (arguing that the neutrality of hate crime
laws “is the root of their legitimacy”).
113. Id.
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groups that may be similarly victimized because of their occupations.114 A
challenge to the law under the Fourteenth Amendment is no longer without
merit. The Blue Lives Matter law thus threatens the legitimacy of
Louisiana’s hate crime statute by exposing it to constitutional attacks that
most likely would have failed before the amendment.115
Furthermore, adding a non-neutral characteristic may lead to overexpansion of the statute. Hate crime laws are undergoing a trend of
expansion.116 Although all existing state statutes include race, ethnicity,
and religion, increasing advocacy efforts by special interest groups have
led some states to include additional characteristics like age, political
affiliation, and personal appearance.117 By lobbying for inclusion of
certain traits, the special interest groups have created contentious politics
about which characteristics should be covered, leading other advocacy
groups to compete for comparative symbolic status for their own group.118
Adding a non-neutral characteristic that specifically references a
single group of people invites other advocacy groups to demand the same
treatment.119 Legislators will be left with the choice of denying some of
these requests while granting others, creating a “slippery slope of legal
favoritism,”120 or avoiding the conflict by unilaterally accepting all
requests. The first option unnecessarily brings contentious politics into the
criminal law.121 The second threatens the utility of the laws. Expansion
creates the misconception that violent acts are treated seriously only when
they are designated as hate crimes and suggests that inclusion in the list of
categories is a symbol of respect.122 This flawed understanding of the
purpose of hate crime laws perpetuates the cycle of over-expansion.123
The existence of hate crime laws is justified by the principle that
perpetrators who commit crimes motivated by certain kinds of bias are
114. See Sethi, supra note 87 (explaining that if police officers are added, there
is no reason not to add lawyers, doctors, or public servants).
115. Steiner, supra note 94, at 837. (“Only if the law protected only
homosexuals, blacks and other minorities, or Jews and Wiccans for example,
would the equal protection argument have any merit.”).
116. Meli, supra note 38, at 927.
117. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 867.
118. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 21.
119. Steiner, supra note 94, at 845.
120. Id. at 846.
121. Beale, supra note 41, at 1269 (noting that symbolic or expressive criminal
legislation presents the special danger of undermining the efficiency of the
criminal law).
122. See L.A. TIMES, supra note 18.
123. Id. (explaining that recent expansion of hate crime laws “creates the
temptation to expand the coverage further to encompass ‘our’ group”).
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more culpable than perpetrators who commit the same crimes for nonbiased reasons.124 If the list of covered “biases” continues to expand,
virtually any crime in which the offender specifically chooses his victim
on any basis could be punishable as a bias crime. Laws aimed at targeting
a specific kind of crime rooted in prejudice would become general penalty
enhancers, eliminating their meaning entirely.125
2. The Blue Lives Matter Law Will Not Be Used Effectively
Even if the hate crime statute was the proper vehicle to bolster police
protection, it would not be effective. The Blue Lives Matter law carries
burdens and risks that make it an inefficient tool for prosecuting the
majority of crimes against police. Prosecutors likely will avoid the
complications of the Blue Lives Matter law and rely instead on previously
existing criminal statutes.126 In some cases, the Blue Lives Matter law may
be used disproportionally against protesters, thereby discouraging citizens
from speaking out against perceived injustices.127 Because an expressive
law’s communicative impact is dependent upon how the law is enforced,
either result will have negative consequences on the public and on hate
crime law as a whole.128
a. Potential Underuse
Prosecutorial charging decisions generally are motivated by the desire
to process cases efficiently and promote fairness and justice.129 A
prosecutor’s desire to seek justice for a hate crime victim often conflicts
with the desire to prosecute efficiently and effectively. 130 When the
difficulty of meeting the burden imposed by hate crime charges outweighs
the possible benefit of doing so, prosecutors have little incentive to use
hate crime laws.131

124. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 133; see also Ginsburg, supra note
35, at 1631 (arguing that a crime committed for a practical reason does not
“generate the same level of revulsion as a crime committed out of” hateful bias).
125. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 133 (arguing that exclusion of
certain traits gives the laws meaning).
126. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a.
127. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b.
128. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 858.
129. Id. at 886.
130. Id. at 887.
131. Id.
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The burden is proving that the offender selected the victim because of
the victim’s employment as a law enforcement officer.132 In the majority
of crimes against police, motives are not obvious or singular.133
Prosecutors who pursue hate crime charges are left to separate the
discriminatory motive from other, often comingling motives134 and prove
the discriminatory motive exists, an extremely difficult task absent a rare
self-incriminating statement from the offender.135 Additionally, hate crime
charges carry the risk of complicating jury selection136 by relying on laws
affiliated with divisive political and social issues.137 Prosecutors often fear
that hate crime charges will make certain jurors more hesitant to convict
or, conversely, more hostile toward defendants accused of certain
biases.138 Charges under the controversial139 Blue Lives Matter law
implicate a debate that has become increasingly partisan, often sharply

132. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:107.2 (2018).
133. Max Kutner, Who Kills Police Officers?, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 21, 2015, 11:50
AM), http://www.newsweek.com/who-kills-police-officers-315701 (explaining that
most often, police killings occur impulsively when officers attempt to arrest a suspect
for a separate offense) [https://perma.cc/AGZ2-9943].
134. Catherine Pugh, What Do You Get When You Add Megan Williams to
Matthew Shepard and Victim Offender Mediation? A Hate Crime Law That
Prosecutors Will Actually Want to Use, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 179, 194 (2008)
(explaining that crimes generally have multiple motives, which contributes to
complexity); Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 892 (arguing that hate crime cases are
difficult if there is any other motive).
135. Pugh, supra note 134, at 191 (“[S]elf-incrimination is such a critical
source of motive evidence that prosecutors generally avoid a hate crime charge in
its absence.”). But see Eversley et al., supra note 1 (exemplifying the rare case in
which the offender supplies his own motive with a self-incriminating statement).
136. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 89394.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 89394, 908 (“[I]t may not matter whether juries are actually capable
of maintaining objectivity in practice; so long as prosecutors continue to believe that
hate crime charges will have adverse effects on the jury pool, this belief alone may
be enough to make it unlikely that prosecutors will include the charges . . . .”).
139. See, e.g., Hilburn, supra note 100 (quoting Ejike Obineme of the New
Orleans chapter of the Black Youth Project 100, “Including ‘police’ as a protected
class in hate crime legislation would serve to provide more protection to an
institution that is statistically proven to be racist in action, policy and impact.”). But
see, e.g., Kevin Conlon, Louisiana Governor Signs ‘Blue Lives Matter’ Bill, CNN
(May 27, 2016, 11:22 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/26/us/louisiana-bluelives-matter-law/ (quoting Louisiana police superintendent expressing support for
the bill) [https://perma.cc/Q36Z-CSEE].
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divided along racial and political lines.140 A prosecutor that brings charges
under the law risks dividing his jury and jeopardizing his chance of a
conviction.141
In relation to the significant burden imposed by hate crime charges,
the benefit is minimal. Most crimes against police already carry harsh
penalties that would be only incrementally increased by hate crime
charges.142 It is unlikely that many prosecutors would willingly take on the
burden of proving motive and the risk of dividing their juries to pursue
hate crime charges that ultimately would have little impact on the
offender’s sentence.143 Instead, the law is likely to be underused by
prosecutors who will choose to rely on previously existing criminal
statutes.144 It may seem that underuse of the Blue Lives Matter law renders
it ineffective but causes no real harm, but underuse will actually have
grave effects on the expressive message of the law.145
The more prominent the expressive element of a law is, the more
significant it is to the public when the law is not used, despite seemingly

140. Dan Balz & Scott Clement, On Racial Issues, America is Divided Both
Black and White and Red and Blue, WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2014), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/politics/on-racial-issues-america-is-divided-both-black-andwhite-and-red-and-blue/2014/12/26/3d2964c8-8d12-11e4-a085-34e9b9f09a58
_story.html (noting that African-American and Causasian Americans have vastly
different perceptions of the police’s role in society, and within the Causasian
community, the division is shaped by partisan identification and ideology)
[https://perma.cc/6NSW-CEHL].
141. Pugh, supra note 134, at 194 (suggesting that prosecutors are mindful of
dividing their juries with hate crime charges).
142. For example, an offender who fatally shot a police officer could be
charged with first-degree murder. To succeed on this charge, the prosecutor would
have to prove that the offender killed the police officer with specific intent to kill
or inflict great bodily harm on a police officer engaged in the performance of his
lawful duties. See LA. REV. STAT. § 14:30(2) (2018). A hate crime charge could
increase the penalty by a maximum of only five years. Id. § 14:107.2. This increase
essentially would be meaningless when added to a sentence of death or life
imprisonment. See § 14:30(2) (providing that first-degree murder carries a
sentence of life imprisonment or death).
143. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 887–89 (explaining that when an added hate
crime charge increases the penalty only incrementally, or when prosecutors feel
that an offender’s sentence is sufficient without a hate crime enhancement, they
may not consider it worthwhile to expend additional resources pursuing hate
crime convictions).
144. Id. at 890.
145. Id. at 904.
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fitting the facts of a case.146 The expressive Blue Lives Matter law147
responded to several highly publicized violent attacks characterized by
clear anti-police motives.148 By enacting the law, the Legislature sought to
demonstrate that anti-police crimes are similar to crimes motivated by
racial or religious prejudice in that they are particularly abhorrent and
warrant the most severe punishment.149 Enactment alone, however, is not
enough to serve an expressive law’s purpose.150 For a law to convey its
intended message fully, it must be enforced.151
Failure to enforce the law not only dilutes its intended message but
may directly contradict it.152 A prosecutor’s decision to avoid hate crime
charges in a case with seemingly prejudicial elements often results in
public outrage.153 The public, particularly members of the group who share
the protected characteristic with the victim, question the purpose of the

146. Id.; see also Pugh, supra note 134, at 196 (“In many cases, the victim and
his or her class feel underserved when a prosecutor bypasses a hate charge in lieu
of a more traditional offense.”).
147. See, e.g., John Newsome & Carma Hassan, ‘Blue Lives Matter’ Bill Set
for Louisiana Governor’s Signature, CNN (May 20, 2016), http://www.cnn.com
/2016/05/20/us/louisiana-blue-lives-matter-legislation/ (quoting a Blue Lives
Matter spokesman’s suggestion that the law “is important because symbolically it
advises that there is value to the lives of police officers”) [https://perma.cc/3V9GU2TF].
148. Crisp, supra note 9.
149. See Newsome & Hassan, supra note 147 (quoting Representative Harris’s
explanation that because crimes targeting police are “like a hate crime,” the crimes
need to be covered by Louisiana’s “extensive hate crime statute”).
150. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 864 (“[W]hen enacting expressive
legislation, legislators should consider carefully what messages they may be
sending both ex ante to potential victims and defendants upon passage of laws and
ex post based on predictions of how prosecutors will use these laws in practice.”).
151. Id. at 899.
152. Id.; see also Beale, supra note 41, at 1267 (questioning how those persons
to whom the message is addressed would react if they knew the statute would be
enforced seldomly).
153. See, e.g., Ned Parker & Mimi Dwyer, Attacks Against LGBT Community
Rarely Prosecuted as Hate Crimes, REUTERS (June 28, 2016, 4:21 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/florida-shooting-hate-crimes/
(criticizing decision not to charge killer of Dionte Greene, a gay man, with a hate
crime) [https://perma.cc/KQG2-P8SC]; Scott Bronstein & Drew Griffin, Victim’s
Son: ‘They Ran Him Over Because He Was Black’, CNN (Jan. 17, 2013, 3:25 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/17/us/mississippi-hit-and-run/index.html (questioning
the lack of hate crime charges in hit and run of a black man in Mississippi)
[https://perma.cc/U3WH-788M].
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law and the sincerity of those who enacted it.154 Each time a prosecutor
fails to bring charges under the Blue Lives Matter law when it seems to
apply, proponents of the law are left wondering whether the government
ever truly intended to protect police from bias-motivated attacks.155
Ultimately, an unenforced law may send the message to both law
enforcement and the public that anti-police crimes are not as serious or
prevalent as legislators suggested upon enactment.156 The value of an
expressive hate crime law comes from its message, and a message that is
undercut or contradicted by the law’s application renders the law
ineffective and potentially harmful.157
b. Potential Misuse
Opponents of the Blue Lives Matter law are concerned that the law
will be used to punish citizens who protest police activity.158 The Blue
Lives Matter law is an impractical tool to prosecute most crimes against
police,159 but it has the potential to be used in situations in which the
prosecutorial burden of proving motive is easier to meet and the relative
impact on the offender’s sentence is more significant.160 Criminal offenses
stemming from protests fall into this category of offenses. For example, a
protester who demonstrates at a police station161 can be charged with
154. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 138 (noting that when hate crime
charges are not applied, “[S]ome journalists, advocacy organizations, politicians,
and individuals charge the police and rival commentators, with hypocrisy, bias,
double standards, and pandering to one group or another.”).
155. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 904.
156. Id. at 899–900.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Sethi, supra note 87 (“Black Lives Matter activists may find
themselves on the receiving end of a particularly perverse application of the new
Louisiana law. A protester who raises his elbows when confronted by a cop could
be charged with a hate crime and assault.”); Marshaun D. Simon, ‘Blue Lives
Matter’: Louisiana Hate Crimes Bill to Protect First Responders, NBC NEWS
(May 23, 2016, 10:03 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/blue-livesmatter-louisiana-hate-crimes-bill-protect-first-responders-n576246 (quoting a
Louisiana public defender predicting that the law could have negative
repercussions for protesters) [https://perma.cc/B46Q-JRTC].
159. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.a (explaining that the burden of proving
anti-police motive often outweighs the minimal effect that successful hate crime
charges have on penalties that are already severe).
160. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 887.
161. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rosner & Daniel Prendergast, 10 Protesters Arrested
Outside Police Station, N.Y. POST (July 21, 2016, 2:54 PM), http://nypost.com
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criminal trespass,162 an offense that carries relatively light penalties: a fine
between $100 and $500, imprisonment for a maximum of 30 days, or
both.163 A hate crime charge could increase the penalties significantly,
adding fines of up to $500 and jail time of up to six months.164 The
potential impact on penalties makes pursuing hate crime charges more
beneficial to the prosecutor, and his burden of proving motive is much less
challenging in these instances. The protesters’ chants165 could support an
allegation of anti-police motive—in many cases, the defendant’s use of
racial epithets or slogans before, during, or after the crime has served as
circumstantial evidence of bias motive.166
Like underuse, misuse of the statute against protesters would have a
detrimental impact on the message of the law. Critics of the Blue Lives
Matter law have alleged that the true motive of the law is not to protect
police from violence but to unilaterally reject calls for police reform and
accountability.167 Use of the statute to punish protesters would validate
/2016/07/21/10-protesters-arrested-outside-police-station/ [https://perma.cc/GZ59XMKZ].
162. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:63 (2018) (defining “criminal trespass” as entering a
structure or movable owned by another without express, legal, or implied authorization).
163. Id.
164. See id. § 14:107.2 (naming criminal trespass as an underlying offense
triggering hate crime charges); see also Simon, supra note 158 (“Any protest in a
police station could be criminal trespass, but now it could also be a hate crime.”).
165. ‘Pigs in a Blanket’ Chant at Minnesota Fair Riles Police, CBS (Aug. 31,
2015, 6:03 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/pigs-in-a-blanket-chant-at-min
nesota-fair-riles-police/ (describing protesters chanting “pigs in a blanket, fry ‘em
like bacon”) [https://perma.cc/6AVV-P6LA]; Paighten Harkins, Tulsa Black Lives
Matter Marchers Call for Justice, Peace, ‘No Racist Police’, TULSA WORLD (July
13, 2016), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/local/tulsa-black-lives-matter-marcherscall-for-justice-peace-no/article_1e3ae192-e3a9-5cd8-aa90-1d56c4ca8ced.html
(describing protest chants of “[n]o justice, no peace, no racist police” and “they say
get back, we say fight back”) [https://perma.cc/595P-E62W].
166. ZACHARY WOLFE, HATE CRIMES LAW § 11:14 (June 2016). See, e.g., State v.
Hendrix, 838 P.2d 566 (Or. 1992) (defendant’s accomplice’s use of racial slurs and
racist slogans supported the conviction of ethnic intimidation); Grimm v. Churchill,
932 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff’s use of racial slurs supported defendant police
officer’s arresting him for violating Illinois’s ethnic intimidation statute).
167. See, e.g., Sethi, supra note 87 (“Making police officers a protected class
is just the latest effort to avoid police accountability.”); see also Kami N. Chavis,
Hate Crime Laws to Protect Police Are Misguided, JURIST (July 13, 2016, 9:19
AM), http://www.jurist.org/forum/2016/07/kami-chavis-hate-crime.php (“[T]he
Louisiana law . . . do[es] not appear to be based on legitimate goals to protect
police, but many critics see them as thinly veiled backlashes to recent calls for
police reform.”) [https://perma.cc/56BR-MY3M].
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these allegations and further deteriorate the relationship between police
officers and communities.168 Such use would also be a direct contradiction
to the understood purpose of hate crime laws. The laws promote justice
and equality by serving as “societal condemnation[s] of racism, religious
intolerance, and other forms of bigotry.”169 That Louisiana’s hate crime
statute can now be used to penalize a person protesting perceived bigotry
and inequality in the criminal justice system is counterintuitive. It sends a
message to the public that by alleging the kind of prejudice that the statute
intends to prevent, a person commits a punishable act of prejudice.170 It
also works to dissuade citizens from exercising their constitutionally
protected right to protest, thus discouraging active participation in the
political realm.171
A New Jersey legislator proposing a Blue Lives Matter bill in his own
state suggested that his bill would be the proper measure to “address the
polarization in this country.”172 Louisiana has demonstrated that enacting
a Blue Lives Matter law does little to address polarization,173 and practical
application of the law is likely to intensify it. Underuse suggests that
legislators had no sincere intentions to protect law enforcement officers
from bias-motivated attacks and frustrates proponents and advocacy
groups who believe that law enforcement is entitled to the full benefit of

168. Chavis, supra note 167.
169. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 167.
170. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 899 (arguing that application of hate crime
charges to non-archetypal hate crimes dilutes the message of combating intergroup
hatred); see also Yanan Wang, Should Attacking Police Officers Become a Hate
Crime? A Minnesota City Says Yes, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/10/08/should-attacking-police-officers-be
come-a-hate-crime-a-minnesota-city-says-yes/ (“Making [police] the first profession
to receive a penalty enhancement under hate crimes legislation would ‘paradoxically,
give legal protection to a group that is notorious for perpetrating violence against the
very people that hate crime laws were originally intended to protect.’”) [https://per
ma.cc/B5Y2-9M4S].
171. Elahe Izadi, Louisiana Is the First State to Offer Hate Crime Protections
to Police Officers, WASH. POST (May 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/05/26/louisianas-blue-lives-matter-bill-just-be
came-law/?utm_term=.3c66a379ae67 [https://perma.cc/HB79-7P2G].
172. Rebecca Beitsch, Is Killing a Police Officer a Hate Crime?, PBS NEWS
(Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/killing-police-officer-hatecrime/ (quoting New Jersey assemblyman Ronald Dancer) [https://perma.cc/YE
7M-XZQZ].
173. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (demonstrating the controversy
of the law).
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the legislation.174 Misuse propagates the incorrect idea that the law’s stated
purpose of police protection actually refers to protecting police from
criticism and accountability.175 Either application breeds resentment and
increases conflict between social groups.176 The Legislature can avoid
these consequences either by repealing the law or extensively modifying
it.
III. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS
Police officers serve a vital purpose in democratic society by enforcing
and upholding the law. The state has a special interest in protecting
“[those] public servants who regularly must risk their lives in order to
guard the safety of other persons and property.”177 It is wrong, however,
to distort Louisiana’s hate crime statute to serve a purpose that is better
accomplished through other means.178 The Blue Lives Matter law should
be repealed or, at the very least, revised.
A. Revising the Law: An Imperfect Solution
Proponents of the law may seek to address its problems through
revision. An adequate revision requires several changes—each of which
presents new problems for the statute. First, legislators must replace
“status as a law enforcement officer” with a generalized characteristic,
such as occupation. Because occupation is a neutral human characteristic,
the addition would properly protect all people from crimes motivated by
occupation-based bias rather than creating a special group.179 Although
this modification is necessary to a valid revision, it is flawed in its
redundancy. Louisiana’s hate crime statute has always included “actual or
perceived membership or service in, or employment with, an

174. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 899.
175. Kelly Riddell, Black Lives Matter and Blue Lives Matter at Odds, WASH.
TIMES (July 29, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jul/29/black
-lives-matter-and-blue-lives-matter-at-odds/ (discussing difficulty of supporting
both Black Lives Matter protests and Blue Lives Matter legislation in modern
debate over policing) [https://perma.cc/HC9K-RFU2].
176. Chavis, supra note 167.
177. Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636 (1977).
178. Steiner, supra note 94, at 843 (“It is wrong, however, to hijack an
effective and intellectually honest legal tool and appropriate it to one’s own
interest group.”).
179. See id. at 812.
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organization.”180 “Organization” is defined broadly,181 covering nearly any
conceivable occupation, including police officers.182 A generalized
occupation characteristic that simply restates the pre-existing law adds no
protection and serves no purpose that could not be equally served by
repealing the Blue Lives Matter law entirely.183
Furthermore, even a neutral characteristic like occupation does not
necessarily belong in a hate crime statute. To properly combat crimes
committed against people because of fundamental features of their
identity,184 the laws should include only identity traits, which are those
traits that yield identifiable groups with some shared self-consciousness or
collective identity.185 Not all identity traits have a place in hate crime laws,
however.186 Scholars suggest adding only those identity traits that
implicate societal fissure lines, or “divisions that run deep in the social
history of a culture.”187 The societal fissure line analysis is based on the
principle that hate crime statutes are not meant to target personal prejudice;
rather, they should target prejudice with a social context that is
recognizable in society.188
180. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:107.2 (2018).
181. § 14:107.2(D) (defining organization as “[a]ny lawful corporation, trust,
company, partnership, association, foundation, or fund”; “[a]ny lawful group of
persons, whether or not incorporated, banded together for joint action on any subject
or subjects”; or “[a]ny entity or unit of federal, state, or local government”).
182. See § 14:107.2; see also Perez-Pena, supra note 12 (quoting Representative
Harris, who explained that the Blue Lives Matter bill simply made explicit what was
already implied by the statute).
183. See Perez-Pena, supra note 12.
184. See discussion supra Part I.B.
185. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 12; see also Jorn, supra note 49, at 324
(explaining that an assortment of people constitutes a group when some portion of
a society views it as “an identifiable group of persons who, to some degree, maintain
a collective identity,” or “common interests, experiences, and solidarity”).
186. See LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 12 (explaining that the list of traits that
could qualify as identity characteristics is over-inclusive and should be narrowed
down through further analysis).
187. Id. at 1112; see also L.A. TIMES, supra note 18 (arguing that a hate
crime, as distinguished from an ordinary crime, “is rooted in a pervasive and
especially pernicious prejudice that infects society at large.”).
188. Id. Lawrence distinguishes between these two types of prejudice with two
hypothetical examples. In the first scenario, Person A decides before meeting
Person B that he dislikes B because B is Jewish, and A believes that Jewish people
are inherently dishonest. In the second scenario, Person C decides before meeting
Person D that he dislikes D because D has blue eyes, and C believes that people
with blue eyes are untrustworthy. C’s prejudice is not group antipathy with a social
context. There may be other individuals that share C’s perception of blue-eyed
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Occupation may constitute an identity trait,189 but it does not implicate
a societal fissure line comparable to race or religion.190 Additionally, a
relatively recent series of high-profile murders of police officers does not
create a societal fissure.191 The idea that society is embroiled in a “war on
cops” originated in 2014 because of “low-frequency, high impact events”
like the ambush style murders of Officers Ramos and Liu.192 It remains
unsupported by convincing evidence. A study conducted by the FBI found
that 51 officers were killed in the line of duty in 2014,193 a significant
increase from the 27 officers killed in 2013.194 The increase is less
alarming, however, when considered in context. The 2013 number was a

people, but there is no cultural history of eye color discrimination and no underlying
ideology or worldview connecting those who discriminate on that basis. Id.; see also
JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 146 (suggesting that hate crime laws target
antipathy with a social context by requiring a showing that the offender’s conduct
was linked to furthering the ideals and goals of a recognized hate group).
189. Much of the dispute over the Blue Lives Matter law has centered around
whether a characteristic like profession actually is an identity trait appropriate for
inclusion in a hate crime law. See, e.g., DENV. POST, supra note 77 (“[B]eing a
police officer is not an innate part of a person’s identity. You’re not born a police
officer.”); see also, e.g., Conlon, supra note 139 (quoting Allison PadillaGoodman, regional director of the Anti-Defamation League, arguing that “working
in a profession” is not the kind of “personal characteristic” to be included in hate
crime laws) [https://perma.cc/U996-DNXN].
190. See LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 13 (suggesting that determining where
societal fissure lines fall requires beginning with classic examples like race or
religion and looking for commonalities between the experiences of those groups and
the experiences of the proposed group); see also Gellman & Lawrence, supra note
35, at 429 (suggesting that determining which characteristics should be covered by
hate crime laws is contextual and requires social evaluation of societal fissure lines).
191. See Steiner, supra note 94, at 15 (arguing that several highly publicized
murders of homeless people do not justify including homelessness in the hate
crime statute).
192. See supra Introduction; see also Perez-Pena, supra note 12 (arguing that
low-frequency, high-impact events drive perception).
193. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 76 (showing that 41 officers
were killed in 2015 in comparison to 51 in 2014).
194. See FBI Releases 2012 Statistics on Law Enforcement Officers Killed and
Assaulted, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Oct. 28, 2013), https://archives.fbi.gov
/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2012-statistics-on-law-enforce
ment-officers-killed-and-assaulted (showing that 27 officers were killed in the line
of duty in 2013, a decrease from 48 in 2012) [https://perma.cc/YEB7-LJKV].
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historic low.195 The 2014 figure was only slightly higher than 2012,196 and
it was followed by a 20% decrease in 2015.197 2016 numbers reveal
another increase.198 Sixty-six officers were killed in the line of duty, 199 a
number bolstered200 by police officer shootings with multiple fatalities in
Dallas201 and Baton Rouge.202 These numbers, however, do not presently
signify a developing trend but instead an unfortunate anomaly.203 The
195. Id.; see also Radley Balko, Once Again, There Is No War on Cops, WASH.
POST (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015
/09/10/once-again-there-is-no-war-on-cops-and-those-who-claim-otherwise-are-play
ing-a-dangerous-game/?utm_term=.5ae162841516 [https://perma.cc/S79R-K5RH].
196. See supra notes 76, 194.
197. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 76 (“Preliminary
statistics released today by the FBI show that 41 law enforcement officers were
feloniously killed in the line of duty in 2015. This is a decrease of almost 20
percent when compared with the 51 officers killed in 2014.”).
198. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI Releases 2016 Statistics for Law
Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted in the Line of Duty (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2016-statistics-for
-law-enforcement-officers-killed-and-assaulted-in-the-line-of-duty [https://perma
.cc/K7Y4-SCUQ].
199. Id.
200. Jason Hanna & Steve Visser, Fallen Officers: 38 Shot Dead in the Line
of Duty in 2016, CNN (Aug. 26, 2016, 3:14 PM) (citing Preliminary 2016 Law
Enforcement Officer Fatalities, NAT’L LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MEMORIAL
FUND, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/officer-fatalities-data/ (last visited Oct. 10,
2016))
[https://perma.cc/6JKM-KMV4],
http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/14
/us/police-officers-fatal-shooting-line-duty-nationwide/ (explaining that 41 officers
were murdered between January 1 and September 19, 2016 in comparison to 28
during the same period of 2015) [https://perma.cc/X8RC-E7FS].
201. In July 2016, a sniper opened fire on Dallas police officers during a police
brutality protest, killing five officers and wounding seven more. See Manny
Fernandez, Richard Perez-Pena & Jonah Engel Bromwich, Five Dallas Officers
Were Killed as Payback, Police Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/us/dallas-police-shooting.html [https://perma
.cc/5CY7-FRDD].
202. In July 2016, a gunman in Baton Rouge fired at officers responding to an
emergency call, leaving three dead and three others wounded. See Amy Ellis Nutt,
Matt Zapotosky & Mark Berman, 3 Police Officers Killed, 3 Wounded in Baton
Rouge; Gunman Dead, WASH. POST (July 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/politics/3-police-officers-killed-3-wounded-in-baton-rouge/2016/07/17/373
4a3a6-4c2f-11e6-aa14-e0c1087f7583_story.html [https://perma.cc/T9AZ-44XE].
203. Max Lewontin, Are Police Deaths Really on the Rise? It Depends on How
You Look at It, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 28, 2016), http://www.csmon
itor.com/USA/Justice/2016/0728/Are-police-deaths-really-on-the-rise-It-dependson-how-you-look-at-it [https://perma.cc/W9TS-BFQM].
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number of officer fatalities in 2016 still fell below the average of the
previous ten years.204 To classify the relatively recent wave of conflict as
a societal fissure line worthy of legislative intervention is premature.205
Although it may seem that early intervention is preferable to inaction,
premature legislation is not without consequence; it signifies acceptance
of the “war on cops” narrative and ultimately strengthens the media’s
portrayal of an ever-widening divide between citizens and police.206
Enactment of the law therefore inadvertently intensifies social divisions
and may contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy.207 Legislators can avoid
these social consequences by exercising restraint and extending hate crime
coverage only to those identity traits that clearly implicate societal fissure
lines.208
The societal fissure line limitation will also help legislators avoid
furthering the current trend of over-expansion that threatens the utility of
hate crime laws.209 Other states have chosen not to use such limitations and

204. Camila Domonoske, Number of Police Officers Killed by Firearms Rose
in 2016, Study Finds, NPR (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/12/30/507536360/number-of-police-officers-killed-by-firearms-rosein-2016-study-finds [https://perma.cc/WHK2-BDNF].
205. See Wang, supra note 170 (comparing the short-term history of crimes
against police to the history of hate crimes against minorities and suggesting that
the ambush murders of police officers are too recent to be considered anything
other than a short-term trend); see also Kate Wheeling, Are Attacks on Police
Hate Crimes?, PAC. STANDARD (May 25, 2016), https://psmag.com/are-attackson-police-hate-crimes-7b9db6fabdee#.2pogcit2r (“[D]espite the ire toward police
in America today, the persecution of police is hardly on par with the persecution
that other protected groups have faced.”) [https://perma.cc/VV5V -Q4ZN];
Derrick Clifton, Killing a Cop Is a Horrible Crime—But It’s Not a Hate Crime,
CHI. READER (July 8, 2016, 5:46 PM), http://www.chicagoreader.com/Bleader
/archives/2016/07/08/killing-a-cop-is-a-horrible-crimebut-its-not-a-hate-crime
(“There’s no comparison between generations of race-based dehumanization and
the many ebbs and flows of public scrutiny or animosity towards police. There’s
no parallel between the occupational hazards faced by police and the lived
realities of protected groups experiencing targeted discrimination and violent
crime based on their immutable identities.”) [https://perma.cc/5SSM-V7TG].
206. See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 64 (arguing that the uncritical
acceptance of a hate crime epidemic may have negative sociopolitical ramifications).
207. Id.
208. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 908 (arguing that legislators should limit
the addition of new protected categories).
209. Id.; see also discussion supra Part II.B.1 (discussing over-expansion of
hate crime laws).
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have added traits like homelessness210 or political affiliation211 to their
respective hate crime statutes. If Louisiana chooses to follow this approach,
however, there may be unfortunate consequences on the statute as a whole.
The societal fissure line justification acts as a bar to over-expansion of hate
crime statutes by giving legislators a logical method to determine which
traits should be included.212 Without the societal fissure line analysis or a
similarly restrictive method in place, it becomes especially difficult for them
to deny any interest group’s demands to include their defining trait.213
The resulting over-expansion would be particularly problematic for
Louisiana’s statute. Its structure is broad enough to include ordinary crimes
of opportunity.214 When a vast number of characteristics are included in a
statute that also covers opportunistic crimes, the potential for “creative
use”215 of the statute is significant.216 As Louisiana’s hate crime law
expands to include even more crime victims, so does the potential to apply
the law in ways that are permissible under the language of the statute but
not aligned with the purpose of hate crime legislation.217 Therefore, if
legislators choose to include traits like “occupation” that do not implicate
societal fissure lines, further modification of the statute is necessary to
limit the application of the statute.

210. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (2018) (providing “homeless status” as a
protected characteristic).
211. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 61-6-21 (2018) (providing “political affiliation”
as a protected characteristic).
212. See LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 12–15; see also Eisenberg, supra note
24, at 908 (suggesting limiting expansion of protected categories to those
categories for which group-based animus is a particular concern).
213. Steiner, supra note 94, at 15.
214. See In re M.S., 896 P.2d 1365, 1377 (Cal. 1995) (ruling that a California
statute, due to its “because of” discriminatory selection structure, contained
nothing in its text that suggested the California Legislature intended to limit
punishment to offenses committed exclusively or even mainly because of the
prohibited bias).
215. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 898 (explaining how New York prosecutors
recently have begun to use the hate crime statute, which includes age as a
protected category and has no animus requirement, to prosecute cases involving
swindling of elderly victims, though those crimes do not involve the “invidious
hatred toward[s] particular groups” that the statute sought to address).
216. Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1602; see also Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 908.
217. See discussion supra Part I.B; see also Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 163132
(arguing that it is troubling that legislators might enact a statute to prohibit a species
of conduct but use the broad language of the statute to harshly penalize a distinct
species of conduct).
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By redrafting the law to include an animus requirement,218 legislators can
ensure that the law is used only in cases of invidious hatred.219 An animus
requirement significantly raises the burden of proof by requiring prosecutors
to prove specifically that the perpetrator was motivated by prejudice, bigotry,
or bias based on the victim’s identity.220 By narrowing the definition of a hate
crime, the addition of an animus requirement alleviates the risk of
overcharging ordinary crimes of opportunity as hate crimes.221
Unfortunately, this change, though necessary to counterbalance
expansion, will have significant ramifications.222 Prosecutors often forego
hate crime charges to avoid the challenges imposed by their steep burdens of
proof.223 An amendment that demands even greater proof of subjective bias
motivation likely will make use of the statute extremely rare.224 Infrequent use
will hinder the expressive value of the hate crime statute,225 which is already
significantly weakened by expansion.226 When the statute is used, convictions
will be difficult to obtain, impairing the practical purpose of the law by
keeping some victims of hate crimes from finding justice.227
Revision of the Blue Lives Matter law is possible, but the complex
revision process ultimately produces a statute that is less effective than the
pre-Blue Lives Matter version in combatting hate crimes.228 A modified
statute is certainly preferable to the current heavily flawed version, but the
impact that a revision will have on the utility of the statute is a high price
to pay for police protection—an objective that can be readily obtained

218. See discussion supra Part I.C.
219. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 908 (“[L]egislators might choose to amend
hate crime statutes by adding an animus requirement, thus eliminating the
possibility that ordinary crimes of opportunity would be charged as hate crimes.”).
220. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
221. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 870; see also JACOBS & POTTER, supra note
27, at 146.
222. See infra note 226 and accompanying text; see also infra note 230.
223. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 892; Pugh, supra note 134, at 191.
224. See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 23 (arguing that narrowly drawn
hate crime statutes, like those requiring animus, can only be used to prosecute the
most obvious of hate crimes, which are rare).
225. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (explaining how the expressive impact
of hate crime law is dependent on enforcement of the law).
226. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 909 (“The addition of too many categories .
. . may dilute the communicative impact of hate crime legislation.”).
227. See discussion supra Part I.B (explaining the practical purpose of hate
crime laws).
228. See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 23; see also supra note 224 and
accompanying text.
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through other sources.229 Revision is a significantly less efficient and less
practical solution than repeal.230
B. Repealing the Law: Nothing Lost, Plenty Gained
The issue of police protection is primarily one of safety, not hate.231 If
the Blue Lives Matter law were to be repealed, police officers would
remain well protected by previously existing criminal laws, which already
offer heightened protection by severely penalizing many serious offenses
against police, including murder,232 battery,233 and aggravated assault.234
If legislators find that police safety is threatened by other offenses not yet
covered, they can draft new provisions to specifically cover those offenses.
This tactic was used by the Legislature in 1997, when disarming a peace
officer was made a criminal offense punishable by up to five years’
imprisonment.235 The addition directly responded to the narrow category
of offenses that would have previously been forced under broader assault
and battery statutes.236 Initially, “disarming” referred only to taking
possession of an officer’s firearm, but the law was later expanded to
include taking possession of any law enforcement equipment.237 The
statute demonstrates how new threats can be addressed effectively through
new provisions, and those provisions can be modified as needed to cover
broader ranges of conduct.
229. See discussion infra Part III.B.
230. See generally JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 23 (explaining the
practical consequences of the animus requirement); see also discussion infra Part
III.B (describing how other criminal law provisions can be used to address crimes
against police officers without requiring changes to the hate crime statute).
231. See L.A. TIMES, supra note 18.
232. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:30(2) (2018).
233. Id. § 14:34.2(B).
234. Id. § 14:37.2.
235. See id. § 14:34.6 (defining “disarming a peace officer” as “when an
offender, through use of force or threat of force, and without the consent of the
peace officer, takes possession of any law enforcement equipment from the person
of a peace officer or from an area within the peace officer’s immediate control,
when the offender has reasonable grounds to believe that the victim is a peace
officer acting in the performance of his duty”).
236. Act No. 558, 1997 La. Acts 901.
237. See Act No. 820, 2010 La. Acts 2790; § 14:34.6 (defining “equipment”
as including “any firearms, weapons, restraints, ballistics shields, forced entry
tools, defense technology equipment, self-defense batons, self-defense sprays,
chemical weapons, or electro shock weapons issued to a peace officer and used in
the course and scope of his law enforcement duties”).
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The Blue Lives Matter law may remain necessary to protect police
officers from the specific class of crimes in which the offender is
motivated by invidious hatred against police as a group. Studies suggest
that when a prosecutor charges an offender with an ordinary offense
instead of a hate crime, the victim and his group feel underserved because
the ordinary charge emphasizes the conduct rather than the hateful
motivation, which is the true source of the additional harm.238 In the case
of police officers, however, the unique harm caused by anti-police
motivation can be addressed through ordinary criminal law.
For example, Louisiana law provides that an offender is guilty of firstdegree murder when he kills with the specific intent to kill or inflict great
bodily harm upon a police officer performing his duties or “when the
[offender’s] specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm is directly
related to the victim’s status as a [police officer].”239 The first clause
emphasizes the offender’s conduct and addresses the practical need to
protect police officers performing a public service.240 The second clause
specifically addresses situations when an offender is motivated to kill a
police officer because of his status as such.241 By making anti-police
motive an aggravating factor, the provision acknowledges the unique harm
inherent in a crime motivated by animosity toward an entire group and
penalizes accordingly.242 If the Blue Lives Matter law is repealed,
legislators can draft similar provisions to apply to other underlying violent
crimes.
Legislators can also use ordinary criminal provisions to address
conduct with elements typically characteristic of hate crimes. Hate crimes
often are intended to intimidate the victim and cause terror within a
community.243 The Legislature demonstrated its ability to respond directly

238. Pugh, supra note 134, at 196.
239. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:30(2).
240. Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636 (1977) (“[T]he fact that the
murder victim was a peace officer performing his regular duties may be regarded
as aggravating circumstance [because] [t]here is a special interest in affording
protection to [those] public servants who regularly must risk their lives in order
to guard the safety of other persons and property.”).
241. Act No. 1056, 2001 La. Acts 2222 (classifying an offense as first degree
murder when the offender had specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm
on a peace officer because of his status).
242. See Pugh, supra note 134, at 196.
243. Sethi, supra note 87; see also Gellman & Lawrence, supra note 35, at 441
(proposing a model statute defining hate crimes as those crimes committed with
a purpose to create terror in a definable community or with the knowledge that
the crime would create a perception of threat against the definable community).
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to crimes with these elements in 1999 by criminalizing the use of a laser244
on a peace officer when the offender has “reasonable grounds to believe
that the officer will . . . be injured, intimidated, or placed in fear of bodily
harm.”245 The statute protects police officers from offenders seeking to
threaten or intimidate them without the complication of requiring a
showing of anti-police motive imposed by the hate crime statute.
In addition to greater functionality, ordinary criminal provisions also
have expressive value.246 Legislators can demonstrate support of law
enforcement officers and condemnation of their attackers through the
harsh penalties that accompany these provisions.247 Because the laws are
easier to apply than the Blue Lives Matter law, their intended message will
not be contradicted by underuse after enactment but will be strengthened
through enforcement.248
Ultimately, repealing the Blue Lives Matter law and relying on new
and existing criminal provisions to prosecute crimes against police officers
will not deprive police officers of either practical protection or expressive
support. Society’s most cherished values are reflected in the criminal law
by applying the harshest penalties to those crimes that violate these
values.249 Louisiana’s criminal law simultaneously can reflect the values
of protecting public servants and protecting citizens from crimes rooted in
bigotry. By addressing these two purposes separately, legislators can avoid
invoking the intergroup controversy that commonly accompanies hate
crime expansion250 or undermining the efficacy of the existing hate crime
law.251
CONCLUSION
In a lawful society, police officers represent order. The public execution
of a police officer who is performing his duties signifies an attack on that

244. See LA. REV. STAT. § 14:37.3 (defining “laser” as “any device that projects a
beam or point of light by means of light amplification by stimulated emission of
radiation or any device that emits light which simulates the appearance of a laser”).
245. Id.
246. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 858.
247. See Perez-Pena, supra note 12.
248. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.a.
249. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 169.
250. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 27, at 133 (arguing that hate crime
expansions inspire inter-group fighting over what should be covered, an exercise
that “hardly contributes to a more tolerant and harmonious society”).
251. Beale, supra note 41, at 1269.
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order.252 Although it may be tempting to legislators to respond to the chaos
with reactionary legislation that symbolically demonstrates support for
lawful order, such action is shortsighted. Legislators must think beyond
enactment and consider the practical application of the law and the purpose
it will serve. The Blue Lives Matter law rarely will be applied to the types
of crimes that inspired its existence and, instead, may be applied in ways
that are both unjust to citizens and contradictory to the purpose of hate crime
laws.
The law does not solve an existing problem but creates new ones by
weakening Louisiana’s hate crime statute and contributing to the widening
divide between citizens and police.253 Protecting police from violence is
critically important, but the protection need not come at such an enormous
societal cost. By repealing or heavily revising the Blue Lives Matter law,
legislators simultaneously can protect police officers and preserve the
validity of Louisiana’s hate crime statute.

Savannah Walker

252. Eversley et al., supra note 1 (calling New York police shootings an attack
on lawful society).
253. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b.
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